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Abstract
The existence of adversarial data examples has drawn significant attention
in the deep-learning community; such data are seemingly minimally perturbed
relative to the original data, but lead to very different outputs from a deep-
learning algorithm. Although a significant body of work on developing defense
models has been developed, most such models are heuristic and are often
vulnerable to adaptive attacks. Defensive methods that provide theoretical
robustness guarantees have been studied intensively, yet most fail to obtain non-
trivial robustness when a large-scale model and data are present. To address
these limitations, we introduce a framework that is scalable and provides
certified bounds on the norm of the input manipulation for constructing
adversarial examples. We establish a connection between robustness against
adversarial perturbation and additive random noise, and propose a training
strategy that can significantly improve the certified bounds. Our evaluation
on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet suggests that our method is scalable to
complicated models and large data sets, while providing competitive robustness
to state-of-the-art provable defense methods.
1 Introduction
Although deep neural networks have achieved significant success on a variety of
challenging machine learning tasks, including state-of-the-art accuracy on large-scale
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image classification [HZRS16, HLVDMW17], the discovery of adversarial examples
[SZS+13] has drawn attention and raised concerns. Adversarial examples are carefully
perturbed versions of the original data that successfully fool a classifier. In the image
domain, for example, adversarial examples are images that have no visual difference
from natural images, but that lead to different classification results [GSS14].
A large body of work has been developed on defensive methods to tackle
adversarial examples, yet most of them remain vulnerable to adaptive attacks
[SZS+13, GSS14, MDFF16, PMW+16, KGB16, CW17b, BRB17, ACW18]. A major
drawback of many defense models is that they are heuristic and fail to obtain a
theoretically justified guarantee of robustness. On the other hand, many works
have focused on providing provable/certified robustness of deep neural networks
[HA17, RSL18, KW17, WZC+18, ZWC+18, DSG+18, WSMK18].
Recently, [LAG+18] provided theoretical insight on certified robust prediction,
building a connection between differential privacy and model robustness. It was
shown that adding properly chosen noise to the classifier will lead to certified
robust prediction. Building on ideas in [LAG+18], we conduct an analysis of model
robustness based on Rényi divergence [VEH14] between the outputs of models for
natural and adversarial examples when random noise is added, and show a higher
upper bound on the tolerable size of perturbations compared to [LAG+18]. In
addition, our analysis naturally leads to a connection between adversarial defense
and robustness to random noise. Based on this, we introduce a comprehensive
framework that incorporates stability training for additive random noise, to improve
classification accuracy and hence the certified bound. Our contributions are as
follows:
• We derive a certified bound for robustness to adversarial attacks, applicable to
models with general activation functions and network structures.
• Using our derived bound, we establish a strong connection between robustness
to adversarial perturbations and additive random noise. We propose a new
training strategy that accounts for this connection. The new training strategy
leads to significant improvement on the certified bounds.
• We conduct a comprehensive set of experiments to evaluate both the theoretical
and empirical performance of our methods, with results that are competitive
with the state of the art.
2 Background and Related Work
Much research has focused on providing provable/certified robustness for neural
networks. One line of such studies considers distributionally robust optimization,
which aims to provide robustness to changes of the data-generating distribution. For
example, [ND17] study robust optimization over a φ-divergence ball of a nominal
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distribution. A robustness with respect to the Wasserstein distance between natural
and adversarial distributions was provided in [SND17]. One limitation of distribu-
tional robustness is that the divergence between distributions is rarely used as an
empirical measure of strength of adversarial attacks.
Alternatively, studies have attempted to provide a certified bound of minimum
distortion. In [HA17] a certified bound is derived with a small loss in accuracy for
robustness to `2 perturbations in two-layer networks. A method based on semidefinite
relaxation is proposed in [RSL18] for calculating a certified bound, yet their analysis
cannot be applied to networks with more than one hidden layer. A robust optimization
procedure is developed in [KW17] by considering a convex outer approximation of
the set of activation functions reachable through a norm-bounded perturbation.
Their analysis, however, is still limited to ReLU networks and pure feedforward
networks. Algorithms to efficiently compute a certified bound are considered in
[WZC+18] by utilizing the property of ReLU networks as well. Recently, their
idea has been extended by [ZWC+18] and relaxed to general activation functions.
However, both of their analyses only apply to the multi-layer perceptron (MLP),
limiting the application of their results.
In general, most analyses for certified bounds rely on the properties of specific
activation functions or model structures, and are difficult to scale. Several works
aim to generalize their analysis to accommodate flexible model structures and large-
scale data. For example, [DSG+18] formed an optimization problem to obtain an
upper bound via Lagrangian relaxation. They successfully obtained the first non-
trivial bound for the CIFAR-10 data set. The analysis of [KW17] was improved in
[WSMK18], where it was scaled up to large neural networks with general activation
function, obtaining state-of-the-art results on MNIST and CIFAR-10. Certified
robustness is obtained by [LAG+18] by analyzing the connection between adversarial
robustness and differential privacy. Similar to [DSG+18, WSMK18], their certified
bound is agnostic to model structure and is scalable, but it is loose and is not
comparable to [DSG+18, WSMK18]. Our approach maintains all the advantages
of [LAG+18], and significantly improves the certified bound with more advanced
analysis.
The connection between adversarial robustness and robustness to added random
noise has been studied in several works. In [FMDF16] this connection is established
by exploring the curvature of the classifier decision boundary. Later, [FGCC19]
showed adversarial robustness requires reducing error rates to essentially zero under
large additive noise. While most previous works use concentration of measure as
their analysis tool, we approach such connection from a different perspective using
Rényi divergence [VEH14]; we illustrate the connection to robustness to random
noise in a more direct manner. More importantly, our analysis suggests improving
robustness to additive Gaussian noise can directly result in the improvement of the
certified bound.
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3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notation
We consider the task of image classification. Natural images are represented by
x ∈ X , [0, 1]h×w×c, where X represents the image space, with h,w and c denoting
the height, width, and number of channels of an image, respectively. An image
classifier over k classes is considered as a function f : X → {1, . . . , k}. In this paper,
we only consider classifiers constructed by deep neural networks (DNNs). To present
our framework, we define a stochastic classifier, a function f over x with output f(x)
being a multinomial distribution over {1, . . . , k}, i.e., P (f(x) = i) = pi for
∑
i pi = 1.
One can classify x by picking argmaxi pi. Note this distribution is different from the
one generated from softmax.
3.2 Rényi Divergence
Our theoretical result depends on the Rényi divergence, defined in the following
[VEH14].
Rényi Divergence For two probability distributions P and Q over R, the Rényi
divergence of order α > 1 is
Dα(P‖Q) = 1
α− 1 logEx∼Q
(
P
Q
)α
(1)
3.3 Adversarial Examples
Given a classifier f : X → {1, . . . , k} for an image x ∈ X , an adversarial example x′
satisfies D(x,x′) <  for some small  > 0, and f(x) 6= f(x′), where D(·, ·) is some
distance metric, i.e., x′ is close to x but yields a different classification result. The
distance is often described in terms of an `p metric, and in most of the literature
`2 and `∞ metrics are considered. In our development, we focus on the `2 metric
but also provide experimental results for the `∞ metric. More general definitions of
adversarial examples are considered in some works [BCZ+18], but we only address
norm-bounded adversarial examples in this paper.
3.4 Adversarial Defense
Classification models that are robust to adversarial examples are referred to as
adversarial defense models. We introduce the most advanced defense models in two
categories.
Empirically, the most successful defense model is based on adversarial training
[GSS14, MMS+17], that is augmenting adversarial examples during training to help
improve robustss of models. TRadeoff-inspired Adversarial DEfense via Surrogate-loss
minimization (TRADES) [ZYJ+19] is a variety of adversarial training that introduces
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a regularization term for adversarial examples: L = L(f(x), y) + γL(f(x, f(xadv)),
where L(·, ·) is the cross-entropy loss. This defense model won the 1st place in the
NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge (Robust Model Track) and has shown
better performance compared to previous models [MMS+17].
On the other hand, the state-of-the-art approach for provable robustness is
proposed by [WSMK18], where a dual network is considered for computing a bound
for adversarial perturbation using linear-programming (LP), as in [KW17]. They
optimize the bound during training to achieve strong provable robustness.
Although empirical robustness and provable robustness are often considered as
orthogonal research directions, we propose an approach that provides both. In our
experiments, presented in Sec. 6, we show our approach is competitive with both of
the aforementioned methods.
4 Certified Robust Classifier
We propose a framework that yields an upper bound on the tolerable size of attacks,
enabling certified robustness on a classifier. Intuitively, our approach adds random
noise to pixels of adversarial examples before classification, to eliminate the effects
of adversarial perturbations.
Algorithm 1 Certified Robust Classifier
Require: An input image x; A standard deviation σ > 0; A classifier f over
{1, . . . , k}; Number of iterations n (n = 1 is sufficient if only the robust classifi-
cation c is desired).
1: Set i = 1.
2: for i ∈ [n] do
3: Add i.i.d. Gaussian noise N(0, σ2) to each pixel of x and apply the classifier f
on it. Let the output be ci = f(x+N(0, σ2I)).
4: end for
5: Estimate the distribution of the output as pj = #{ci=j:i=1,...,n}n .
6: Calculate the upper bound:
L = sup
α>1
(
−2σ
2
α
log
(
1− p(1) − p(2) + 2
(
1
2
(
p1−α(1) + p
1−α
(2)
)) 11−α))1/2
where p(1) and p(2) are the first and the second largest values in p1, . . . , pk.
7: Return classification result c = argmaxi pi and the tolerable size of the attack L.
Our approach is summarized in Algorithm 1. In the following, we develop theory
to prove the certified robustness of the proposed algorithm. Our goal is to show that
if the classification of x in Algorithm 1 is in class c, then for any examples x′ such
that ‖x− x′‖2 ≤ L, the classification of x′ is also in class c.
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To prove our claim, first recall that a stochastic classifier f over {1, . . . , k} has
an output f(x) corresponding to a multinomial distribution over {1, . . . , k}, with
probabilities as (p1, . . . , pk). In this context, robustness to an adversarial example
x′ generated from x means argmaxi pi = argmaxj p′j with P (f(x) = i) = pi and
P (f(x′) = j) = p′j , where P (·) denotes the probability of an event. In the remainder
of this section, we show Algorithm 1 achieves such robustness based on the Rényi
divergence, starting with the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let P = (p1, . . . , pk) and Q = (q1, . . . , qk) be two multinomial distribu-
tions over the same index set {1, . . . , k}. If the indexes of the largest probabilities do
not match on P and Q, that is argmaxi pi 6= argmaxj qj, then
Dα(Q‖P ) ≥ − log
(
1− p(1) − p(2) + 2
(
1
2
(
p1−α(1) + p
1−α
(2)
)) 11−α)
where p(1) and p(2) are the largest and the second largest probabilities in pi’s.
To simplify notation, we define Mp(x1, . . . , xn) = ( 1n
∑n
i=1 x
p
i )
1/p as the generalized
mean. The right hand side (RHS) of the condition in Lemma 1 then becomes
− log (1− 2M1 (p(1), p(2))+ 2M1−α (p(1), p(2))).
Lemma 1 proposes a lower bound of the Rényi divergence for changing
the index of the maximum of P , i.e., for any distribution Q, if Dα(Q‖P ) <
− log (1− 2M1 (p(1), p(2))+ 2M1−α (p(1), p(2))), the index of the maximum of P and
Q must be the same. Based on Lemma 1, we obtain our main theorem on certified
robustness as follows, validating our claim.
Theorem 2 Suppose we have x ∈ X , and a potential adversarial example x′ ∈ X
such that ‖x − x′‖2 ≤ L. Given a k-classifier f : X → {1, . . . , k}, let f(x +
N(0, σ2I)) ∼ (p1, . . . , pk) and f(x′ +N(0, σ2I)) ∼ (p′1, . . . , p′k).
If the following condition is satisfied, with p(1) and p(2) being the first and second
largest probabilities in {pi}:
sup
α>1
−2σ
2
α
log
(
1− 2M1
(
p(1), p(2)
)
+ 2M1−α
(
p(1), p(2)
)) ≥ L2
then argmaxi pi = argmaxj p′j
With Theorem 2, we can enable certified robustness on any classifier f by adding
i.i.d. Gaussian noise to pixels of inputs during testing, as done in Algorithm 1.
It provides an upper bound for the tolerable size of attacks for a classifier, i.e.,
as long as the pertubation size is less than the upper bound (the “sup” part in
Theorem 2), any adversarial sample can be classified correctly. Compared to the
upper bound in PixelDP [LAG+18], our upper bound is strictly higher. We illustrate
the improvement using a simulation in the Appendix.
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Confidence Interval and Sample Size Note in practice that we can only es-
timate p(1) and p(2) from samples, thus the obtained lower bound is not precise
and requires adjustment. Note that (p1, . . . , pk) forms a multinomial distribution,
therefore the confidence intervals for p(1) and p(2) can be estimated using one-sided
Clopper-Pearson interval along with Bonferroni correction. We refer to [LAG+18]
for further details. In all our subsequent experiments, we use the end points (lower
for p(1) and upper for p(2)) of the 95% confidence intervals for estimating p(1) and
p(2), and multiply 95% for the corresponding accuracy. Moreover, the estimates for
the confidence intervals are more precise when we increase the sample size n, but at
the cost of extra computational burden. In practice, we find a sample size of n = 100
is sufficient.
Choice of σ The formula of our lower bound indicates a higher standard deviation
σ results in a higher bound. In practice, however, a larger amount of added noise also
leads to higher classification error and a larger gap between p(1) and p(2), which gives
a lower bound. Therefore, the best choice of σ2 is not obvious. We will demonstrate
the effect of different choices of σ2 in the experiments of Sec. 6.
5 Improved Certified Robustness
Based on the property of generalized mean, one can show that the upper bound is
larger when the difference between p(1) and p(2) becomes larger. This is consistent
with the intuition that a larger difference between p(1) and p(2) indicates more
confident classification. In other words, more confident and accurate prediction in
the presence of additive Gaussian noise, in the sense that p(1) is much larger than p(2),
leads to better certified robustness. To this end, a connection between robustness to
adversarial examples and robustness to added random noise has been established by
our analysis.
Such a connection is beneficial, because robustness to additive Gaussian noise
is much easier to achieve than robustness to carefully crafted adversarial examples.
Consequently, it is natural to consider improving the adversarial robustness of a
model by first improving its robustness to added random noise. In the context of
Algorithm 1, we aim to improve the robustness of f to additive random noise. Note
improving robustness to added Gaussian noise as a way of improving adversarial
robustness has been proposed by [ZNR17] and was later shown ineffective [CW17a].
Our method is different in that it requires added Gaussian noise during the testing
phase, and more importantly it is supported theoretically.
There have been notable efforts at developing neural networks that are robust to
added random noise [XXC12, ZZC+17]; yet, these methods failed to defend against
adversarial attacks, as they are not particularly designed for this task. Within our
framework, since Algorithm 1 has no constraint on the classifier f , which gives the
flexibility to modify f , we can adapt these methods to improve the accuracy of
classification when Gaussian noise is present, hence improving the robustness to
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adversarial attacks. In this paper, we only discuss stability training, but a much wider
scope of literature exists for robustness to added random noise [XXC12, ZZC+17].
5.1 Stability Training
The idea of introducing perturbations during training to improve model robustness
has been widely studied. In [BAP14] the authors considered perturbing models
as a construction of pseudo-ensembles, to improve semi-supervised learning. More
recently, [ZSLG16] used a similar training strategy, named stability training, to
improve classification robustness on noisy images.
For any natural image x, stability training encourages its perturbed version
x′ to yield a similar classification result under a classifier f , i.e., D(f(x), f(x′))
is small for some distance measure D. Specifically, given a loss function L∗ for
the original classification task, stability training introduces a regularization term
L(x,x′) = L∗+γLstability(x,x′) = L∗+γD(f(x), f(x′)), where γ controls the strength
of the stability term. As we are interested in a classification task, we use cross-
entropy as the distanceD between f(x) and f(x′), yielding the stability loss Lstability =
−∑j P (yj|x) logP (yj|x′), where P (yj|x) and P (yj|x′) are the probabilities generated
after softmax. In this paper, we add i.i.d. Gaussian noise to each pixel of x to construct
x′, as suggested in [ZSLG16].
Stability training is in the same spirit as adversarial training, but is only designed
to improve the classification accuracy under a Gaussian perturbation. Within
our framework, we can apply stability training to f , to improve the robustness of
Algorithm 1 against adversarial perturbations. We call the resulting defense method
Stability Training with Noise (STN).
Adversarial Logit Pairing Adversarial Logit Pairing (ALP) was proposed in
[KKG18]; it adds D(f(x), f(x′)) as the regularizer, with x′ being an adversarial
example. Subsequent work has shown ALP fails to obtain adversarial robustness
[EIA18]. Our method is different from ALP and any other regularizer-based approach,
as the key component in our framework is the added Gaussian noise at the testing
phase of Algorithm 1, while stability training is merely a technique for improving
the robustness further. We do not claim stability training alone yields adversarial
robustness.
6 Experiments
We perform experiments on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets, to evaluate the
theoretical and empirical performance of our methods. We subsequently also consider
the larger ImageNet dataset. For the MNIST data set, the architecture of our model
follows the models used in [TKP+17], which contains two convolutional layers, each
containing 64 filters, followed with a fully connected layer of size 128. For the
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CIFAR-10 dataset, we use a convolutional neural network with seven convolutional
layers along with MaxPooling. In both datasets, image intensities are scaled to [0, 1],
and the size of attacks are also rescaled accordingly. For reference, a distortion of
0.031 in the [0, 1] scale corresponds to 8 in [0, 255] scale. The source code can be
found at https://github.com/Bai-Li/STN-Code.
6.1 Theoretical Bound
With Algorithm 1, we are able to classify a natural image x and calculate an upper
bound for the tolerable size of attacks L for this particular image. Thus, with a given
size of the attack L∗, the classification must be robust if L∗ < L. If a natural example
is correctly classified and robust for L∗ simultaneously, any adversarial examples x′
with ‖x − x′‖2 < L∗ will be classified correctly. Therefore, we can determine the
proportion of such examples in the test set as a lower bound of accuracy given
size L∗.
We plot different lower bounds for various choices of σ and L∗, for both MNIST
and CIFAR-10, in Figure 1. To interpret the results, for example on MNIST, when
σ = 0.7, Algorithm 1 achieves at least 51% accuracy under any attack whose `2-norm
size is smaller than 1.4.
Figure 1: Accuracy lower bounds for MNIST (left) and CIFAR-10 (right). We
test various choices of σ in Algorithm 1. For reference, we include results for PixelDP
(brown), lower bounds without stability training (purple), and empirical accuracy of
TRADES against PGD attacks (pink).
When σ is fixed, there exists a threshold beyond which the certified lower bound
degenerates to 0. The larger the deviation σ is, the later the degeneration happens.
However, larger σ also leads to a worse bound when L∗ is small, as the added noise
reduces the accuracy of classification.
As an ablation study, we include the corresponding lower bound without stability
training. The improvement due to stability training is significant. In addition, to
demonstrate the improvement of the certified bound compared to PixelDP [LAG+18],
we also include the results for PixelDP. Although PixelDP also has tuning parameters
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δ and  similar to σ in our setting, we only include the optimal pair of parameters
found by grid search, for simplicity of the plots. One observes the accuracy lower
bounds for PixelDP (green) are dominated by our bounds.
We also compare STN with the approach from [WSMK18]. Besides training a
single robust classifier, [WSMK18] also proposed a strategy of training a sequence
of robust classifiers as a cascade model which results in better provable robustness,
although it reduces the accuracy on natural examples. We compare both to STN in
Table 1. Since both methods show a clear trade-off between the certified bound and
corresponding robustness accuracy, we include the certified bounds and corresponding
accuracy in parenthesis for both models, along with the accuracy on natural examples.
Table 1: Comparison on MNIST and CIFAR-10. The numbers “a (b%)” mean a
certified bound a with the corresponding accuracy b%.
MNIST CIFAR-10
Model Robust Accuracy Natural Robust Accuracy Natural
[WSMK18] (Single) 1.58 (43.5%) 88.2% 36.00 (53.0%) 61.2%
[WSMK18] (Cascade) 1.58 (74.6%) 81.4% 36.00 (58.7%) 68.8%
STN 1.58 (69.0%) 98.9% 36.00 (65.6%) 80.5%
Our bound is close to the one from [WSMK18] on MNIST, and becomes better
on CIFAR-10. In addition, since the training objective of [WSMK18] is particularly
designed for provable robustness and depends on the size of attacks, its accuracy on
the natural examples decreases drastically when accommodating stronger attacks.
On the other hand, STN is capable of keeping a high accuracy on natural examples
while providing strong robustness guarantees.
Certified Robustness on ImageNet As our framework adds almost no extra
computational burden on the training procedure, we are able to compute accuracy
lower bounds for an ImageNet classifier. ImageNet [DDS+09] is a large scale image
dataset that contains over 1 million images with 1,000 classes. To the best of our
knowledge, currently only PixelDP [LAG+18] is able to obtain non-trivial certified
bound on ImageNet. We include the corresponding results in the Appendix.
6.2 Empirical Results
We next perform classification and measure the accuracy on real adversarial examples
to evaluate the empirical performance of our defense methods. For each pair of
attacks and defense models, we generate a robust accuracy vs. perturbation size
curve for a comprehensive evaluation. We compare our method to TRADES on
MNIST and CIFAR-10. Although we have emphasized the theoretical bound of the
defense, the empirical performance is promising as well. More details and results of
the experiments, such as for gradient-free attacks, are included in the Appendix.
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Avoid Gradient Masking A defensive model incorporating randomness may
make it difficult to apply standard attacks by causing gradient masking as
pointed in [ACW18], thus achieving robustness unfairly. To ensure the robust-
ness of our approach is not due to gradient masking, we use the expectation
of the gradient with respect to the randomization when estimating gradients
to ensemble over randomization and eliminate the effect of randomness as rec-
ommended in [ACW18, CAP+19]. In particular, the gradient is estimated as
Er∼N(0,σ2I) [∇x+rL(θ,x+ r, y)] ≈ 1n0
∑n0
i=1 [∇x+riL(θ,x+ ri, y)], where ri’s are i.i.d.
samples from N(0, σ2I) distribution, and n0 is the number of samples. We assume
thread models are aware of the value of σ in Algorithm 1 and use the same value for
attacks.
White-box Attacks For `∞ attacks, we use Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
attacks [MMS+17]. It constructs an adversarial example by iteratively updating the
natural input along with the sign of its gradient and project it into the constrained
space to ensure its a valid input. For `2 attacks, we perform Carlini & Wagner
attack [CW17b] which constructs an adversarial example via solving an optimization
problem for minimizing distortion distance and maximizing classification error. We
also use technique from [LCWC19] that has been shown more effective against
adversarially trained model, where the gradients are estimated as the average of
gradients of multiple randomly perturbed samples. This brings a variant of Carlini
& Wagner attack with the same form as the ensemble-over-randomization mentioned
above, therefore it is even more fair to use it. The results for white-box attacks are
illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: MNIST and CIFAR-10: Comparisons of the adversarial robustness
of TRADES and STN with various attack sizes for both `2 and `∞. The plots
are ordered as: MNIST(`2), MNIST(`∞), CIFAR-10(`2), and CIFAR-10(`∞). Both
white-box (straight lines) and black-box attacks (dash lines) are considered.
Black-box Attacks To better understand the behavior of our methods and to
further ensure there is no gradient masking, we include results for black-box attacks.
After comparison, we realize the adversarial examples generated from Madry’s model
[MMS+17] result in the strongest black-box attacks for both TRADES and STN.
Therefore, we apply the `2 and `∞ white-box attacks to Madry’s model and test the
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Figure 3: Robust accuracy of STN with different choices of σ for both `2 and `∞
attacks. The plots are ordered as: MNIST(`2), MNIST(`∞), CIFAR-10(`2), and
CIFAR-10(`∞).
resulting adversarial examples on TRADES and STN. The results are reported as
the dashlines in Figure 2.
Summary of Results Overall, STN shows a promising level of robustness, es-
pecially regarding `2-bounded distortions, as anticipated. One observes that STN
performs slightly worse than TRADES when the size of attacks is small and becomes
better when the size increases. Intuitively, the added random noise dominantly
reduces the accuracy for small attack size and becomes beneficial against stronger
attacks. It is worth-noting that Algorithm 1 adds almost no computational burden
as it only requires multiple forward passes, and stability training only requires aug-
menting randomly perturbed examples. On the other hand, TRADES is extremely
time-consuming, due to the iterative construction of adversarial examples.
Choice of σ In previous experiments, we use σ = 0.7 and σ = 100
255
for MNIST and
CIFAR-10, respectively. However, the choice of σ plays an important role, as shown
in Figure 1; therefore, we study how different values of σ affect the empirical robust
accuracy in Figure 3. The results make it more clear that the noise hurts when small
attacks are considered but helps against large attacks. Ideally, using an adaptive
amount of noise, that lets the amount of added noise grow with the size of attacks,
could lead to better empirical results, yet it is practically impossible as the size of
attacks is unknown beforehand. In addition, we include results for σ = 0, which is
equivalent to a model without additive Gaussian noise. Its vulnerability indicates
the essential of our framework is the additive Gaussian noise.
7 Conclusions
We propose an analysis for constructing defensive models with certified robustness.
Our analysis leads to a connection between robustness to adversarial attacks and
robustness to additive random perturbations. We then propose a new strategy
based on stability training for improving the robustness of the defense models. The
experimental results show our defense model provides competitive provable robustness
Li & Chen & Wang & Carin 13
and empirical robustness compared to the state-of-the-art models respectively. It
especially yields strong robustness when strong attacks are considered.
There is a noticeable gap between the theoretical lower bounds and the empirical
accuracy, indicating that the proposed upper bound might not be tight, or the
empirical results should be worse for stronger attacks that have not been developed,
as has happened to many defense models. We believe each explanation points to a
direction for future research.
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A Comparison between Bounds
We first use simulation to show our proposed bound is higher than the one from
PixelDP [LAG+18].
In PixelDP, the upper bound for the size of attacks is indirectly defined: if
p(1) ≥ e2p(2) + (1 + e), where  > 0 and δ > 0 are two tuning parameters, and the
added noise has the distribution N(0, σ2I), then the classifier is robust to attacks
whose `2 size is less than σ√
2 log(1.25/δ)
.
As both our and their bound are determined by the models and data only through
p(1) and p(2), it is sufficient to compare them with simulation for different p(1) and
p(2) as long as p(1) ≥ p(2) ≥ 0, p(1) + p(2) ≤ 1 and p(1) + p(2) ≥ 0.2 are satisfied, i.e.,
p(1) and p(2) are valid first and second largest output probabilities.
For fixed σ,  and δ are tuning parameters that affect the result. For a fair
comparison, we use a grid search to find  and δ that maximizes their bound.
Figure 4: The upper bounds under different p(1) and p(2). Our bound (red) is strictly
higher than the one from PixedDP (blue).
The simulation result in Figure 4 shows our bound is strictly higher than the
one from PixelDP. In particular, when p(1) and p(2) are far apart, which is the most
common case in practice, our bound is more than twice as high as theirs.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 Let P = (p1, . . . , pk) andQ = (q1, . . . , qk) be two multinomial distributions
over the same index set {1, . . . , k}. If the indexes of the largest probabilities do not
match on P and Q, that is argmaxi pi 6= argmaxj qj, then
Dα(Q‖P ) ≥ − log
(
1− p(1) − p(2) + 2
(
1
2
(
p1−α(1) + p
1−α
(2)
)) 11−α)
(2)
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where p(1) and p(2) are the largest and the second largest probabilities in pi’s.
Proof Think of this problem as finding Q that minimizes Dα(Q‖P ) such that
argmaxpi 6= argmaxqi for fixed P = (p1, . . . , pk). Without loss of generality, assume
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pk.
It is equivalent to solving the following problem:
min∑
qi=1,argmaxqi 6=1
1
1− α log
(
k∑
i=1
pi
(
qi
pi
)α)
As the logarithm is a monotonically increasing function, we only focus on the
quantity s(Q‖P ) =∑ki=1 pi ( qipi)α part for fixed α.
We first show for the Q that minimizes s(Q‖P ), it must have q1 = q2 ≥ q3 ≥ · · · ≥
qk. Note here we allow a tie, because we can always let q1 = q1 −  and q2 = q2 + 
for some small  to satisfy argmaxqi 6= 1 while not changing the Renyi-divergence
too much by the continuity of s.
If qj > qi for some j ≥ i, we can define Q′ by mutating qi and qj, that is
Q′ = (q1, . . . , qi−1, qj, qi+1 . . . , qj−1, qi, qj+1, . . . , qk), then
s(Q‖P )− s(Q′‖P )
=pi
(
qαi − qαj
pαi
)
+ pj
(
qαj − qαi
pαj
)
=(p1−αi − p1−αj )(qαi − qαj ) > 0
which conflicts with the assumption that Q minimizes s(Q‖P ). Thus qi ≥ qj for
j ≥ i. Since q1 cannot be the largest, we have q1 = q2 ≥ q3 ≥ · · · ≥ qk.
Then we are able to assume Q = (q0, q0, q3, . . . , qk), and the problem can be
formulated as
min
q0,q2,...,qk
p1
(
q0
p1
)α
+ p2
(
q0
p2
)α
+
k∑
i=3
pi
(
qi
pi
)α
subject to 2q0 + q3 + · · ·+ qk = 1
subject to qi − q0 ≤ 0 i ≥ 1
subject to − qi ≤ 0 i ≥ 0
which forms a set of KKT conditions. Using Lagrange multipliers, one can obtain the
solution q0 = q
∗
1−p1−p2−2q∗ and qi =
pi
1−p1−p2−2q∗ for i ≥ 3, where q∗ =
(
p1−α1 +p
1−α
2
2
) 1
1−α .
Plug in these quantities, the minimized Renyi-divergence is
− log
(
1− p1 − p2 + 2
(
1
2
(
p1−α1 + p
1−α
2
)) 11−α)
Thus, we obtain the lower bound of Dα(Q‖P ) for argmaxpi 6= argmaxqi.
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C Proof of Theorem 2
A simple result from information theory:
Lemma 3 Given two real-valued vectors x1 and x2, the Rényi divergence of
N(x1, σ
2I) and N(x2, σ2I) is
Dα(N(x1, σ
2I)‖N(x2, σ2I)) = α‖x1 − x2‖
2
2
2σ2
(3)
Theorem 2 Suppose we have x ∈ X , and a potential adversarial example
x′ ∈ X such that ‖x − x′‖2 ≤ L. Given a k-classifier f : X → {1, . . . , k}, let
f(x+N(0, σ2I)) ∼ (p1, . . . , pk) and f(x′ +N(0, σ2I)) ∼ (p′1, . . . , p′k).
If the following condition is satisfied, with p(1) and p(2) being the first and second
largest probabilities in pi’s:
sup
α>1
(
− 2σ
2
α
log
(
1− 2M1
(
p(1), p(2)
)
+ 2M1−α
(
p(1), p(2)
)))
≥ L2 (4)
then argmaxi pi = argmaxj p′j
Proof From lemma 3, we know for x and x′ such that ‖x− x′‖2 ≤ L, with a k-class
classification function f : X → {1, . . . , k}:
Dα(f(x
′ +N(0, σ2))‖f(x+N(0, σ2)))
≤Dα(x′ +N(0, σ2)‖x+N(0, σ2))
≤αL
2
2σ2
if N(0, σ2) is a standard Gaussian noise. The first inequality comes from the fact
that Dα(Q‖P ) ≥ Dα(g(Q)‖g(P )) for any function g.
Therefore, if we have
− log (1− 2M1 (p(1), p(2))+ 2M1−α (p(1), p(2))) ≥ αL2
2σ2
(5)
It implies
Dα(f(x
′ +N(0, σ2))‖f(x+N(0, σ2)))
≤− log (1− 2M1 (p(1), p(2))+ 2M1−α (p(1), p(2))) (6)
Then from Lemma 1 we know that the index of the maximums of f(x+N(0, σ2))
and f(x′ +N(0, σ2)) must be the same, which means they have the same prediction,
thus implies robustness.
D Details and Additional Results of the Experi-
ments
In this section, we explain the details of our implementation of our models and
include additional experimental results.
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D.1 Certified Robustness on ImageNet
Since only PixelDP [LAG+18] is able to obtain non-trivial certified bound on Ima-
geNet, we compare out bound to theirs:
Figure 5: We compare the certified bound from STN and PixelDP on ImageNet. We
include results for two different values for σ to illustrate how the bounds change
accordingly.
Our bound clearly dominants the certified bound from PixelDP, which is consistent
with our observations on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
D.2 Gradient-Free methods
We include results for Boundary Attack [BRB17] which is a gradient-free attack
method. Boundary attack explores adversarial examples along the decision boundary
using a rejection sampling approach. Their construction of adversarial examples
do not require information about the gradient of models, thus is an important
complement to gradient-based methods.
We test Boundary attacks on MNIST and CIFAR10 and compare them to other
attacks considered.
From the plots, one can see Boundary attack is not effective in attacking our
models. This is consistent with the observation from [CAP+19] that gradient-free
method is not effective against randomized models. Nevertheless, we include the
results as a sanity check.
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Figure 6: MNIST: Comparisons the adversarial robustness of STN against various
types of attacks for both `2 (left) and `∞ (right).
Figure 7: CIFAR-10: Comparisons the adversarial robustness of STN against
various types of attacks for both `2 (left) and `∞ (right).
